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AIJSTRACT
Public ownership and development of land is a powerful means of controlling
the development of an urban area, avoiding high speculative costs of land for
housing and public purposes, and siphoning increases in land values that
accompany urban growth into the public purse. In Stockholm and Canberra, the
balance between these three objectives in the use ofpublic land has differed over
time. Control of development has become dominant in Canberra while financial
objectives have continued to be important in Stockholm.
Whereas public ownership and leasehold tenure of developed land have been
used by Stockholm City Council as a means of maintaining a public role in the
land market following urban development, the Federal Government in
Canberra have done this to a much smaller extent. The City of Stockholm has
been an active ground landlord; the Government in Canberra has been almost
completely passive, using lease conditions solely as a means of controlling land
use. The paper explores historical reasons for the difference between the two
cities. Importantly, both the initiative and financial responsibility were taken
locally in Stockholm but by the national government in relation to its national
capital, Canberra.
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A I'ALE OFTWO CITIES:
Public Land Ownership in Canberra and Stockliolin^
Max Neutze
Urban Rcsearcli Unit, RSSS, ANU
It is frequently argued that land is different from other things that are
bought and sold in the market. People who believe that relatively free markets
work well in general sometimes argue that land is special and support
restrictions on its ownership and use. Put another way, decisions about the use
of land, more than most decisions, have an impact on members of the
community other than the owner of the land, particularly in urban areas. It
follows that the community, in some form or other should, and usually does,
have some say in the use to which land is put.
The property rights of land owners are always limited but the degree of
limitation varies with the tenure and with the legal context in different
countries. Whereas laws of trespass in Australia restrict access to privately
owned land, in Sweden the public has access to all land as long as they do no
damage and do not infringe privacy.
The classical means by which communities influence land use is through
land use controls which prevent all but the permissible uses in designated areas.
”A mere veto is, however, something of a blunt instrument if the ambition is to
be able to steer development and change" (Heimberger, 1976, p. 24). One
possibility is for the community, usually in the form of a local government
authority, to reach agreement with landowners. Another is for the community
itself to take on the role of land owner. The objective of this paper is to explore
the experience of two very different cities where decisions were made around
the turn of the century that the community should exercise control over land use
by taking on the role of land owner.
In Sweden, until the beginning of the 19th century, no private person had
the right to own land in the towns; all of it belonged either to the town or the
Crown. Hie rise of economic liberalism during the nineteenth century resulted
i Much of the infonnation about Stockholm is derived from Ratzka (1980) and about Swedish
land policy in general from Heimberger (1976) which have been used extensively to broaden
and update infomiation collected for my 1973 study (Neutze, 1977). Other information comes
from IFHP (1985) and Anas el al. (1985). More details about Canberra can be found in
Brennan (197 1) and two other papers (Neutze, 1987; 1988).
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in much urban land becoming the property of individuals and companies who
had the right to determine its use. From around the turn of the century there
was a gradual reversal of the trend towards privatization of land for a number
of reasons.
One important reason was that rapid urbanisation was leading to
overcrowded housing and rapidly rising rents bringing fears of unrest among
the urban proletariat. Another had its origins in rural rather than urban areas.
Large areas of land which had previously been held as small farms was bought
by large forestry companies leading to displacement of owner-farmers and clear
felling. A third was the desire of citizens to shape the future growth of their
cities and to benefit from increases in site value over time. The City of
Stockholm began an active purchasing policy in the 1880s and made its first
large purchase in 1904 when it bought nearly 2000 hectares, more than the
entire built-up area of the city. It bought several agricultural estates in
neighbouring municipalities that were then incorporated into the city. Tlie
purchases were facilitated because much of the land near the city was held in
very large estates. Most of this land was used for the construction of single
family housing on leasehold sites. By 1910, excluding land bought for open
space, the city owned some 3000 hectares and over the next 60 years this
expanded to 40,000 hectares.
"Hie use of leasehold tenure in Swedish cities and towns goes back as far as
the Middle Ages. In 1530 during the Reformation extensive church properties
were confiscated and handed over to the cities which, in turn, leased them to
users. Tliose leases were granted in perpetuity at fixed rents which lagged so far
behind market values that they came to be seen as a form of taxation and the land
as indistinguishable from freehold.
In 1907 a Leasehold Act was passed which changed the rules governing the
leasing of land to facilitate the development of housing on land leased from
municipalities. The objective of the national government in encouraging
municipal ownership of land was to enable them to make land available for
housing at a modest rental. Housing was encouraged also by the establishment ot
the Land Distribution Fund in 1907 to help cooperative societies, often founded
by labour unions, to provide housing lots for their members. The Leasehold
Act provided for a limited, though renewable, lease period, fees (land rent) to
be renegotiated on the expiry of the term, prescription of the precise land use,
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and for die stmctures built on the leased sites to be acceptable as collateral for
mortgage borrowing. No private body was permitted to dispose of land with
leasehold tenure because that was thought likely to foster slum housing. In the
same year a new Planning Act was passed which made land use controls legally
binding for the first time.
!n Australia, since Aborigines were not regarded by the invading
Europeans as owning land, the whole of the continent was regarded as crown
land from the time of European settlement . Initial occupation of much of rural
Australia was under some kind of lease. During the nineteenth century land
policy was one of the major political issues (Else-Mitchell, 1974; Roberts,
1924). On the one side were those who favoured private ownership of the land
as a way of encouraging settlement and development and who were frequently
took advantage of opportunities for alienation from the crown at prices that
were much below market value. On the other side were the advocates of
leasehold who argued that speculative ownership did not result in development
and that lease covenants could at the same time require that land be developed
and obtain for the community the unearned increment in its value. Iliough the
majority of the more productive parts of the continent were soon converted to
freehold, in some states large areas of extensive grazing land are still held under
leasehold title. In the urban areas almost all privately occupied land is freehold.
When, in the 1890s, the political leaders of the six colonies were planning
to federate they paid particular attention to the proposed national capital. T hey
were anxious to avoid in it the land speculation which had occurred in the
established cities (Cannon, 1966). lliey were also influenced by Henry George,
the American reformer, who was a strong advocate of land as a suitable base for
taxation (George, 1881) and who visited Australia in 1890. Others, including
Edmund Barton, Australia's first prime minister, pointed out that the value of
urban land results from the actions of tlie community as a whole rather than
those of the individual landowner, and the increase in its value should therefore
accrue to the community rather than to private owners.
One result of the popularity of these views was that Australia and New
Zealand were among the few countries to adopt the unimproved value of land as
the basis for local government taxes. Another result was the decision,
implemented through Section 125 of the Constitution, the Scat ofGovciutiicnt
Act (1908), the Seat of Government (Acceptance) Act (1909) and the Seat of
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Government (Administration) Act (1910), that the Capital Territory should be
acquired by the Commonwealth and that the land should remain in public
ownership and be leased rather than sold. In this way the 'betterment' would
accrue to the public. Fhe site for Canbeira, the national capital, was acquired by
the mid-1920s and the remainder of the Territory, 2358 square kilometres in
all, in the 1960s.2
Local and National Initiatives
In Sweden, the local governments (and in particular Stockholm) were
primarily involved in initiating the system of public ownership of land for
urban development. Apart from providing enabling legislation (Leasehold Act
and Planning Act) the national government provided no other assistance to
municipalities until after the second world war when a new Expropriation Act
(1949, amended in 1953 and 1971) facilitated compulsory purchase of land for
housing and loans were made available for municipal leasehold (1966) and
municipal land acquisition (1968). In 1938 the City of Stockholm decided that it
in future it would lease rather than sell land it had purchased.
Prior to its designation as the seat of government, the Australian Capital
Territory was a sparsely populated pastoral district in which there had been no
local initiative for urban development . Hie views about leasehold that have
developed in the local community as the city has grown are ambivalent. There
has, however, been general support for the public ownership of land prior to
urban development. Canberra has no local or territorial government and
therefore the administration of the public land estate has been the responsibility
of a series of national government departments and authorities. Tlie whole cost
of purchasing and developing the land has been borne by the national
government and all revenue from leases has been paid into national revenue.
In Canberra public ownership of land administered through the leasehold
system has been seen as an imposition by the national government; when new
generations of national politicians with different priorities came into oftice
there was little to prevent erosion. In contrast, in Sweden the local authority
acts as both the initiator of public land ownership and development programs,
- The 1960s acquisition was questioned by the owners who had plans drawn up for its
development, perhaps in order to argue for a price based on its value for urban rather than non-
urban use.
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and administrator of leasehold tenure. This helps to explain why, as the later
sections of this paper show, the integrity of leasehold has been maintained in
Stockholm to a much greater extent than in Canberra. In particular, the fact that
the costs of purchase and management have been borne by the city and the land
rents received by the city has ensured close local political interest in its
operation.
Although Stockholm had the first and has the largest stock of land of all
Swedish municipalities many others have followed the same path. Some of them
sell land for development and others lease it. fleimberger (1976) reports that
nationally 60 per cent of housing constructed in the decade to the mid-1970s was
on land purchased from municipalities and another 20 per cent on land leased
from them. In contrast to this situation, purchase of tlie site for Canberra was
regarded as a special measure, warranted because it was to be the national
capital. Following the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into
Land Tenures {First Report, 1973) government purchase of raw land for future
urban development was assisted by the national government in a number of
cities. In few cases were the developed sites leased for development. While
leasing of rural land in Australia is not uncommon it is quite rare in urban areas.
As a result Canberra is seen as exceptional and its leasehold system not well
understood.
Objectives
The three objectives generally pursued through public ownership of land
are:
1 . A lower cost of land for urban use, especially for housing and for public
purposes such as open space, schools and roads;
2. A source of income for public puq:)Oses, either from the capital gain if the
land acquired at rural values is sold for urban purposes, or from land
rents if it is rented; and
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3. More effective urban planning through public ownership so as to avoid
competition between the planning authority and private owners of
freehold in determining the use of land: the specification of development
rights in the lease agreement is a clear and positive means of controlling
land use.
Whether public ownership of land is likely to achieve any or all of these
objectives is open to question (see, for example, Carr and Smith, 1975). T\\t
intention in this section is not to assess the extent of success (see Ratzka, 1980
and Neutze, 1987) in pursuing the objectives, but to trace which objectives were
the most important in the each city at different periods.
The primary objective of the national government of Sweden was the
provision of cheaper housing. Cheaper housing was also an important objective
for Stockholm though it was concerned also to ensure that its real estate
operation
,
if not profitable, at least was not a net cost to the city treasury.
Ratzka reports several attempts to assess the effectiveness of the policy,
especially in terms of the returns to the city. Most of those attempts fail to take
account of the very considerable value of the stock of land held by the city at the
end of the evaluation period and therefore understate the true return. Ratzka's
own assessment shows that investment in land has been profitable for the city
and has returned more than the city's borrowing rate on the capital invested.
Tlie first two objectives are, as Ratzka points out, in competition with one
another: the more housing costs fall as a result of lower land prices or rents, the
smaller are the returns on the public investment in land. Political pressures to
keep down land rents for housing have significantly reduced the return on the
City's investment in land. From the City's point of view, however, cheap land
for open space and other public uses is itself a return on investment. It appears
that both of the first two objectives have been significant throughout the century
but that low cost housing has probably become a more important objective in
recent decades.
Land use planning is mentioned relatively little in the early documents
dealing with the establishment of public land ownership in Sweden.
Nevertheless, Swedish cities have used their purchases of land extensively to
provide for future development. This has been most apparent in the building of
new communities, linked to other parts of the city by public transport and fully
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planned in advance of any actual building. From experience both in Sweden and
other countries it is difficult to imagine such programs being carried out
without public ownership of the land, llie so-called "municipal monopoly" of
urban development is maintained not only by a statutory planning system which
covers land owned by the cities as well as privately owned land, but also by the
availability of cheap loans for both construction and long tenn ownership of
housing which, since 1975, have been available only for housing built on
municipally owned land. Tlie municipal monopoly is both a cause and an effect
of the powerful initiating role municipalities play in urban development. Since
1907 all development in areas covered by plans, and since the 1947 Building and
Planning Act all urban development, has had to accord with a detailed
development plan. The municipalities normally both plan and initiate
development.
llic main objective of the founders of the Australian Federation for public
ownership of land in Canberra was to reap for the community a substantial share
of the increase in the value of the land that was expected to occur as the city was
built. Indeed, it was claimed, with the experience of the land boom of the 1880s
fresh in mind, that the return on investment in the city’s site could pay a
substantial part of the operating costs of the new Commonwealth Government.
Tlie public finance goal seemed to be paramount. Nevertheless, cheap land for
urban use was also an objective: public ownership would avoid the land
speculation that had recently occurred in and around other Australian cities and
had resulted in high land prices.
Over the years there has been a dramatic change in the objectives which
have been pursued in Canberra. Ilie public finance goal gradually became less
important during the 1930s and 1940s as a result of depression and war, and
then because rent revisions were deferred and became politically unpopular in
the 1950s and 1960s. It disappeared almost entirely in 1971 when land rents
were abolished. Even in the absence of self government, there was strong
political pressure to reduce land rents during the whole period of collection.
Because local residents did not benefit from the revenue collected there was
almost no opposition to their abolition. Tliere remained, of course, the return
which the Commonwealth received when leases of non-urban land were sold for
development, but that was not much than the cost of servicing the land. Once
such a lease had been issued the government received a financial return from it
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only if the lessee gained approval for a change of purpose clause, when a 50 per
cent betterment levy was charged.
It has often been claimed that low cost housing has been a further objective
of land policy in Canberra. Public ownership of land for development can
reduce the price of housing sites by ensuring a sufficient supply of land for
building to meet the demand and avoiding speculative holding of vacant serviced
sites. Wliether the price is actually reduced depends on whether the responsible
authority is able to accurately estimate future demand and has sufficient
resources to service enough land to meet it. As a monopoly supplier it can
influence the price by varying supply. Costs of servicing are a more important
component that the cost of raw land. Comparisons are difficult, but house prices
in Canberra are not clearly lower than in other comparable cities. Land for
public use, however, for the purposes of the Federal Government and for the
needs of the city, is available much more cheaply in Canberra since the raw land
was purchased at its non-urban value. Even with carrying costs and
development costs it is less costly than in other cities.
As in Stockholm, land use planning ranks very little mention in the
discussions of land policy in the early history of Canberra. It may have been
assumed that, with the purchase of the site and the successful conclusion to a
competition for the design of the city, the land use planning had been completed;
it simply remained to build to the selected design. In the event, the control
public ownership of land gives the government over the supply of land for
different urban uses at different locations and over the use of land has become
the most important objective of public land ownership in Canberra. "Hie whole
of the site is in public ownership and there is no statutory control over land use
as there is in other parts of Australia. The sole control over the use to which a
lease may be put is tlie purpose clause in the lease. Public land ownership has
made it possible to establish in Canberra, alone among Australian cities, a
planning authority which is also a development authority and which actually
initiates development rather than simply waiting for and reacting to the





In the absence of a competitive market for leases, the monopolistic supplier has
to find some means of allocating them. When land rents are set below what the
market would pay for the supply provided, a rationing device is required. If
land rents exceed the market level for that supply, not all of the supply will be
taken up and lots will be available over the counter. Wailing lists have been
employed as the rationing device in Stockholm whenever, as has Ix^en common,
rents for housing sites were below market-clearing levels. One result was that
those who received residential leases could, if they wished, sell them at a
considerable profit within a short time.
In Canberra a number of different measures have been used over the years,
hi the first years leases were auctioned to establish a market-clearing price, dlie
rent charged was then 5 per cent of the sum bid. In effect the bids were for rents
to be paid for the first 20 years. Perhaps because buyers discounted their future
obligations to pay land rent at more than 5 per cent per year, or perhaps because
they expected increases in land values that did not materialise (the first leases
were auctioned in the mid-1920s!), many of these leases were subsequently
surrendered. From 1935 the first 20 years' land rent was based on a reserve
price set prior to the auction and any amount bid above that price had to be paid
immediately as a cash premium. Unrealistic bids were less common under the
new system. Finally, with the abolition of land rents from 1971, the bidding was
for a capital sum: the premium in what had become purely a premium leasehold
system. Since the first auctions there have been periods when supply exceeded
demand and land was available over the counter by paying, until 1971, the first
year's land rent and after 1971, the reserve price. There have been other
periods when supply was less than demand and high premiums were paid.
For the most part, the same means were used to allocate land in Canberra
for non-residential as for residential uses, with the emphasis on reserve prices
and auctions, and with land available at the reserve price when it was not
reached at the auction, lliere is, however, provision for direct negotiation
between the government and prospective business lessees. In Stockholm,
reflecting the emphasis on housing goals, very little land was made available for
commercial and industrial purposes prior to 1950, but since then, with the
increased emphasis on new communities, the number of non-residential leases
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has expanded rapidly. Ratzka estimated that by the late 1970s about one third of
all commercial and industrial land within the City was leased from the City. The
objective has been to set market rentals for non-residential leases, though it
seems probable that these too lag behind tme market values.
Ixind Rent Setting and Revision
As reported above, land rents in Canberra were 5 per cent of the sum bid at
auction from 1924 to 1935 and 5 per cent of the reserve price from 1935 to
1971 when land rents were abolished. Five per cent was maintained despite
changes in the rate of interest. It is less clear how the reserve price was set.
Broadly, for residential land the reserve price was related to costs of production
and for businesses leases, it was set at a conservative market value. Whether the
raw land was entered at book value or included holding costs is not clear. It
would be unlikely to have been entered at its replacement value as there was no
market for raw land from which replacement value could be assessed.
In Canberra, a consequence of having only a single (federal) level of
government v/as that the discussion of these matters occurred solely within the
bureaucracy. Without any locally responsible government, they did not need to
be exposed to public scrutiny. The first leases provided for rent revision after
20 years and then each 10 years. When they were revised they were set at 5 per
cent of the estimated market value at the time of the revision. Revision of the
first leases came due during World War II but was deferred. When they were
revised after 20 or more years, especially after inflation at the rates experienced
after the second world war, some rents were increased by many times.
Tlie abolition of land rents in Canberra was announced during a by election
for the local seat in the national parliament. It resulted in part because they were
perceived as of no benefit to the Canberra community since they flowed directly
into national revenue, and they were not sufficiently important for the national
Parliament to be concerned about the revenue they produced. In addition local
taxes had been very low for a long time and, as in Sweden in the sixteenth
century, land rents had become almost indistinguishable from property taxes.
Hiey had, however, one feature that made them even more unpopular: they
were revised very substantially every 20 years rather than by a small amount
each year. When land rents were abolished, property rates were adjusted
upward to raise the same revenue as they, plus land rents, had previously raised.
Very few people in Australia protested that the abolition of land rents resulted in
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an end to any hope that the founders* plans for the collection of betterment
would be achieved, or that a very valuable national asset was being given away
in a fit of absentrnindedness. The national parliament should have been the
guardian of those matters but it had lost interest.
In Stockholm the rent-setting procedure for housing land is clearer and has
been a matter of intense debate. For new residential leases a value is set which is
the actual cost to the city of producing the sites, comprising capital costs,
holding costs and administrative costs, all at book value unadjusted for inllation.
National legislation requires that local governments cover all costs but they must
not make a profit on residential portion of their real estate operations. 'I'he
annual lease fee (land rent) is then a percentage of their costs, the percentage
being based on the current average interest rate for municipal bonds with a 10
year maturity.
Before 1953 land rents in Sweden were set for the whole life of the lease,
usually 60 years for residential leases in Stockholm. The 1953 Amendment to
the Leasehold Act uses the criterion of a fair rate of return on the market value
of the site at the time of rent revision, taking into consideration land rents on
contracts being written for comparable new leases, d’his criterion is not
necessarily consistent with the requirement that local authorities cover costs and
make no profits on their real estate investments in land for housing. Lvidence
presented by Ratzka suggests that land rents on some of the older residential
leases are a very low percentage of their current market value, implying that
revisions have been made on conservative estimates of market value or of the
'fair* rale of return or both.
Recent Supreme Court decisions in Sweden have been concerned with the
rate at which land rent should be calculated from the capital value of a site. The
Court decided to accept a recommendation that the rate of appreciation in values
should be taken into account in setting land rents. ITe principle, which derives
from capital theory (Jorgenson, 1965) and has received some recognition in
literature on housing values (Anstie et ciL, 1983; Bethune and Neulze, 1987),
shows the current value of a stream of net returns that are expected to increase
over time at a constant rate. Whereas the current value of a constant stream of
net returns of R for an infinite period will have a present value o{ RH where i is
the discount rate, the value of a stream that is expected to increase at the rate of a
per cent per year will be R/(i - a). If y is the allowable rate of return on assets
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whose value is fixed in money terms, the owner of an asset expected to
appreciate in value by a per cent per year will need a return of only (y - a) per
cent per year. Such an argument implies that a relatively low rate of return on
the capital value is acceptable if it is anticipated that returns, and hence the value
of die urban land, will continue to increase.
A fundamental problem with all of these rules is that the general level of
the market value of sites is itself a result of policy. The Commonwealth
Government in Canberra and the Swedish local governments arc in such strong
monopoly positions as suppliers of land that they can have a major impact on
market value by increasing or decreasing the supply. In Canberra there is some
political constraint because buyers can and do compare land and housing prices
in Canberra with those in other cities, and a market constraint because they can
choose to buy in Queanbeyan which is within commuting distance but outside the
Capital Territory. In Stockholm a small volume of development occurs on
privately owned land and there is some competition between municipalities to
attract development. Nevertheless, in neither city can the general level of
market values be used as if it were an independent rent-determining criterion. It
is much more sensible to set rents on the basis of costs and attempt to meet
demand at those rents as long as sufficient resources are available. For selling
relative land rents for housing sites, market values arc appropriate. Market
rents must necessarily be used for commercial sites because they have a natural
monopoly value.
Period of the Lease
Under the 1907 Leasehold Act in Sweden, lease terms could be between 50 and
75 years. Stockholm chose 60 years with the provision that the lease could be
renegotiated if the city did not want the land after 60 years. Tlie assumption was
that after 60 years, when the leases expired, the sites would be ready to be
cleared and made available for multi-family housing. A 1953 amendment to the
Leasehold Act required that at the end of a 60 year lease the lessee was to be
given another 40 year lease unless the city had given notice of cancellation.
ITcreafter, successive periods of 40 years were to be offered. Lessees have a
very secure title. If a lease is withdrawn during one of the periods the lessee is
compensated for disruption, though not if it is withdrawn at the end of a 60 or
40 year period. In either case the lessee is compensated for the value of
improvements to the site.
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Residential leases in Canberra are almost invariably for 99 years.
Commercial and industrial leases were originally for the same period. After the
war, commercial leases for shorter terms were issued but they can now be
renewed for 99 years at any time for the payment of a modest premium. In both
kinds of leases there has been, since 1936, provision for compensation for the
value of improvements if the lease is not renewed. 'Fhere has been a government
announcement that residential leases will be renewed at the end of their 99 years
without payment of a further premium (though no amendment to tlie
Ordinance). This implies that in effect they have become leases in peipctuity
with a zero land rent, financially if not legally indistinguishable from freehold.
It is widely believed that it would be politically impossible for a government to
make residential leases significantly less attractive than freehold. I’he way in
which they differ is that residential leases can be converted to non-residential
use only by application to the Supreme Court and after payment of a betterment
charge.
In the early 1970s some commercial leases in Canberra had less than 20
years to run and the lessees expressed concern about their, or potential buyers',
ability to borrow on the security of leases which had such a limited life, and
about the financial wisdom of investing in buildings on such leases. It was not
the first time that the value of a Canberra lease as security for a mongage loan
had been questioned. Early in the history of its leasehold system lending
institutions had expressed reservations about the security of leases. As in
Sweden, the reaction of the government was to reassure investors that they were
secure and to back up that assertion by a reluctance to terminate leases. In this
respect, too, Canberra leases have become as secure as freehold. In effect the
government now has to pay as much in compensation to resume a lease as to
acquire freehold. Hie reaction to protests of insecurity near the end of a
commercial lease was to allow lessees to renew leases for a further 99 years well
before their expiry date.
Redevelopment
It is often argued that leasehold tenure facilitates redevelopment because
lease temis can be set so that the lease matures at the time a building is ready for
redevelopment. In Stockholm the initial intention was to lease land for single
family housing for 60 years, then make it available for multi-family housing and
sell it freehold. Unfortunately, it is seldom possible to predict with accuracy so
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far in advance when redevelopment of a site will become appropriate. Even if it
was possible there would be serious problems with buildings deteriorating as
their leases run out (though this may be economically optimal for individual
properties, its environmental effects may be undesirable). In any event, the
mechanisms for handling commercial redevelopment of leasehold sites has
become a serious issue in Canberra because all redevelopment had to occur on
leasehold sites. In Stockholm, where development of commercial and industrial
leasehold sites began later, there is plenty of privately-owned commercial and
industrial land available for redevelopment.
While the planning and development authority in Canberra, the National
Capital Development Commission (NCDC), took full advantage of the public
ownership of undeveloped land in its initial development of rural land for urban
use, this is not true of redevelopment (Neutze, 1988). Once the land is in urban
use the Commission seems to accept the view which commercial lessees and
developers have promoted: that the lease should be treated as if it was freehold.
(In part, this results from the efforts that have been made to assure mortgage
lenders that Canberra leases were secure collateral for loans.) It follows that, in
respect to leased land, the Commission secs itself as similar to a planning
authority in any other Australian city except that its land use control instmment
happens to be a lease purpose clause rather than a statutory planning scheme.
Even where the Commission directly initiated residential redevelopment it was
unable to take advantage of the fact that the sites for redevelopment were held
under leases.
llicre is provision under Section 1 1 A of the City Area Leases Ordinance
for a lessee to apply to the Supreme Court for a variance of the lease purpose
clause. Hie Minister can veto such applications, in which case they do not go to
the Court but, as far as is known, has seldom imposed such a veto. ILc matter is
complicated because the leasehold system is administered by the ACT
Administration, part of a Commonwealth Government department, which
provides services and administration for the Australian Capital Territory, while
the NCDC is an independent statutory authority, although under the same
Minister. The Administration has been criticised for its lease administration as
some lessees have breached their lease purpose clauses over many years without
prosecution (Wensing, 1986).
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Commercial redevelopment in Canberra is directly initiated by
lessees,
though either the Commission or the Administration may encourage
or actively
promote it. In this respect, they neglect the role which a ground
landlord would
be expected to play in initiating redevelopment when it is thought
appropriate.
The public sector, having no financial stake in the lease, seems to assume
that it
has no development responsibility, except on unleased land. I he
leasing
authority should negotiate the purchase of leases o\ sites where redevelopment is
desirable.
The situation in Stockholm is different, 'fhe municipality is likely to
initiate redevelopment where it believes it appropriate and might enter into a
partnership arrangement with a private developer or freehold land owner. II
lessees wish to redevelop a site they have to get the permission of both the City
Real Estate Department - the ground landlord - and the Planning Department.
If permission is granted land rent is automatically adjusted to accord with the
value of the site with the new lease purjx^se clause. A Canberra lessee who is
successful before the Supreme Court (and to date all have been) will be charged
a bettennent levy of half of the assessed increase in value less $ 1 500 - all that is
left, after the initial conversion to urban use, of the plans ol the lounders to
recover substantially all of the betterment resulting from the building ol the new
national capital.
Conclusion
Why the great difference between the two cities when they stalled out along
similar lines and when they handle the conversion of rural land to urban use in a
very similar fashion? An immediate explanation is that Canberra's institutions
do not recognise, as Stockholm's do, the distinction between the function of
owner of the land and that of the planning authority. In Stockholm the Real
Estate Department and the Planning Department are recognised as having
separate and complementary roles in the development and administration of
urban land. Planning schemes control the use of land owned by the municipality
as well as privately owned land. I'he Stockholm Real Estate Department is seen
as an investing and development authority which has to work within the
constraints of the planning scheme. To guide future developments the National
Capital Development Commission has begun to produce policy plans for parts of
Canberra which are noted by the Minister. Thus the Commission has
increasingly fulfilled the role of planning authority within the established urban
15
3rea, but the role of ground landlord in the established urban area, formally the
role of the ACT Administration, continues to be exercised in a completely
passive way, lending substance to the view that Canberra leases are almost
indistinguishable from freehold.
Unlike their Swedish counterparts, the planners and administrators of land
in Canberra seem uncomfortable with the idea that they might make commercial
judgements about what kinds of redevelopment are appropriate. This is
surprising in the light of their readiness to make those Judgements at the time of
initial development. In a property market in which all land is owned by the
government the planners and administrators may sec the right of lessees to
initiate redevelopment as an important safeguard against inappropriate land
allocations. There could be such safeguards, of course, without the public sector
adopting its current completely passive role.
I'he different financial arrangements also have had important effects.
Despite access to concessional loans, Stockholm City Council has had to take full
financial responsibility for its real estate operation. Its costs are borne by city
residents and businesses and the returns benefit them. In Canberra, however, all
costs were paid and all revenue received by the national government. There has
not even been a land development/management account which would show
whether the operation was paying its way.
Underlying these differences is the fact that land purchase, development and
leasing were initiated by Stockholm City Council, though with the
encouragement of the national government. In Canberra they were initiated by
the national government without the introduction of local responsibility as the
city has grown. To make matters worse, the national government has lost
interest in such matters.
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